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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Wayne Ray Floyd timely appealed from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. On appeal, Mr. Floyd asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion to suppress the State's evidence, to wit, methamphetamine. Specifically, he 
argues that his consent for police to enter his home was the product of coercion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
At approximately 8:00 P.M. in early February 2014, Officer Richardson and 
Officer Finley were in separate unmarked patrol cars and were looking for two wanted 
men. (07/31/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-21, p.10, L.1 - p.11, L.3, p.23, Ls.3-10.) Officer 
Richardson noticed two men walking on a street and thought they might be the two 
people for which he was looking. (07/31/14 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.6.) Officer Richardson 
activated his lights and started talking with the two men. (07/31/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-11, 
p.10, Ls.4-12.) About thirty to forty seconds after Officer Richardson initially contacted 
the two men, Officer Finley pulled his car over and approached Officer Richardson's 
location. (07/31/14 Tr., p.23, L.5 - p.24, L.7.) Both of the officers were wearing police 
uniforms and had visible firearms. (07/31/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-24, p.24, Ls.2-18.) 
Officer Richardson quickly determined that the two men, Mr. Floyd and Jose 
Alvarez, were not the people for which he was looking. (07/31/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-16.) 
During that conversation, Officer Richardson noticed that Mr. Floyd's eyes were dilated 
and that he smelled of burnt marijuana. (07/31/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-11.) Officer Richardson 
then asked Mr. Floyd if he had been using marijuana and Mr. Floyd said he had just 
smoked some at his house. (07/31/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.12-18.) Officer Richardson "offered 
to collect the paraphernalia at [Mr. Floyd's] house, and [Officer Richardson] would 
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dispose of it." (07/31/14 Tr., p:11, Ls:14-2'1.) Mr. Floyd said he was "okay" with that 
plan, because "it had been agreed upon that if [Officer Richardson] retrieved the 
paraphernalia, [Mr. Floyd] would [not] be charged with intoxicated pedestrian." 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.21-22, p.18, Ls.2-16.) 
Since Mr. Floyd's house was about half of a city block from the place where he 
was stopped by Officer Richardson, Officer Richardson and Officer Finley followed 
Mr. Floyd as he walked back to his home. (07/31/14 Tr., p.11, L.23 - p.12, L.1.) 
Without further conversation, Officer Richardson, Officer Finley, and a third unnamed 
police officer entered Mr. Floyd's home and followed Mr. Floyd into a bedroom. 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-11, p.37, Ls.10-12.) Upon entering the bedroom, Officer 
Richardson noticed a woman sitting on a bed and explained to her about the plan to 
take the paraphernalia. (07/31/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.13-14.) The woman opened a drawer, 
and Officer Richardson noticed a metal pipe, a glass pipe, and a silver pill vial. 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.15-24.) Officer Richardson then asked Mr. Floyd and the woman 
if he could search the rest of the bedroom for drugs or drug paraphernalia. (07/31/14 
Tr., p.13, Ls.8-15.) At that point, the woman left the room and Mr. Floyd directed Officer 
Richardson to the remaining contraband located in the bedroom. (07/31/14 Tr., p.14, 
Ls.8-17.) During this search of the bedroom, Officer Richardson discovered a spoon 
with residue that tested positive for methamphetamine. (07/31/14 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, 
L.7.) 
Mr. Floyd was charged, by Information, with possession of a controlled 
substance, methamphetamine, and manufacturing with intent to deliver paraphernalia. 
(R., pp.14-15.) Mr. Floyd filed a suppression motion and a statement in support, 
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wherein he argued that his initial consent to the police's entry into his home was the 
product of coercion. (R., pp.21-23.) 
A hearing on Mr. Floyd's suppression motion was held, and Officer Richardson's 
initial conversation with Mr. Floyd was the pivotal issue. Officer Richardson testified 
that he asked Mr. Floyd if "we could go back and get [the marijuana pipe], and 
[Mr. Floyd] said yes." (07/31/14 Tr., p.19, L.23 - p.20, L.5.) Officer Richardson 
conceded it was possible that Mr. Floyd thought that Officer Richardson was going to 
wait outside of Mr. Floyd's home while Mr. Floyd retrieved the pipe. (07/31/14 Tr., p.20, 
Ls.6-9.) 
Based on the forgoing, the district court found that there was no express verbal 
consent for the officers to enter Mr. Floyd's home. (07/31/14 Tr., p.40, Ls.16-20.) The 
district court found that "the statement of . . Officer Richardson, that Mr. Floyd 
consented to all of them going back to the home to retrieve the paraphernalia 
necessarily implied that they would have to go inside the home to retrieve the 
paraphernalia, because that's where the paraphernalia was." (07/31/14 Tr., p.41, Ls.10-
17.) The district court also found its conclusion was supported by the fact that Mr. Floyd 
walked to his home, let the officers into the home, led the officers to the room, and 
consented to the subsequent search of the room. (07 /31 /14 Tr., p.41, Ls.18-24.) 
As mentioned above, Mr. Floyd argued that his consent was the product of 
coercion because of the combination of Officer Richardson's promise that Mr. Floyd 
would not be arrested. (R., pp.21-24; 07/31/14 Tr., p.34, L.23 - p.37, L.20.) The district 
court asked Mr. Floyd if he had any authority for the proposition that a promise by police 
to not arrest a defendant in return for the defendant's consent to a search is coercive 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.5.) Mr. Floyd's counsel said that the promise was a 
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factor relevant to the determination of whether Mr. Floyd's consent was coerced. 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.37, L.21 - p.38, L.5.) The district court never expressly addressed this 
theory, and, as mentioned above, ruled that Mr. Floyd consented to Officer 
Richardson's request because Officer Richardson asked if "they" could go back to 
Mr. Floyd's home. (07/31/14 Tr., p.39, L.4 - p.42, L.18.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Floyd pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance and preserved his ability to challenge the denial of his suppression 
motion on appeal. (R., pp.29-34, 37-38.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of four years, with one year fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed 
Mr. Floyd on probation. (R., pp.47-50.) Mr. Floyd timely appealed. (R., pp.57-58.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Floyd's motion to suppress the evidence 
discovered in Mr. Floyd's home following an unlawful search under the Fourth 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Flo d's Motion To Su ress The Evidence 
Discovered In Mr. Floyd's Home Following An Unlawful Search Under The Fourth 
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I Section i 7 Of The Idaho 
Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Floyd argues that he was overcome by Officer Richardson's coercion when 
he allowed Officer Richardson to enter his home. There are various factors pointing to 
an atmosphere of involuntary consent, which included Mr. Floyd's initial nighttime 
seizure, the arrival of another police officer in a separate vehicle, and Officer 
Richardson's promise that Mr. Floyd would not be arrested if he cooperated with Officer 
Richardson. 
8. Standard Of Review 
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the 
district court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See, e.g., 
State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). Second, this Court reviews de nova 
the trial court's application of constitutional and legal principles to the facts as found. Id. 
at 485-486. 
C. Law enforcement's Entry Into Mr. Floyd's Home Was Not Exempted From The 
Warrant Requirement Under The Consent Exception 
Mr. Floyd has liberty interests which are protected by the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution, which provides: that "[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated." Further, Mr. Floyd has similar liberty interests 
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protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. 1 See State v. 
Christensen, ·131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998) ("Like the Fourth Amendment, the purpose of 
Art. I, § 17 is to protect Idaho citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy against 
arbitrary governmental intrusion."). "A warrantless search is presumptively 
unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the 
warrant requirement" State v. Tyler, 153 Idaho 623, 626 (Ct. App. 2012). The State 
has the burden to establish the applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement. 
State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857,861 (Ct App 2001). 
A recognized exception to the warrant requirement is commonly referred to as 
the consent exception. A search conducted with freely given consent is an exception to 
the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 4 l 2 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). It is 
the State's burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was 
voluntary rather than the result of duress, coercion, direct or implied. Id. at 221. A 
voluntary decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker." Id. at 225. An individual's consent is involuntary, on the other 
hand, if his/her "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired." Id. In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne, the court must 
assess "the totality of all surrounding circumstances of the accused and the details of 
the interrogation." Id. at 226. Accordingly, whether consent was granted voluntarily, or 
was the product of coercion, is a factual determination to be based upon the 
surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and the 
1 Mr. Floyd is arguing under the Idaho Constitution because Idaho's exclusionary rule is 
more expansive than its federal counterpart. See State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511 (2012). 
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possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party from whom consent is elicited. Id. at 
229. 
"Factors to be considered include whether there were numerous officers involved 
in the confrontation, the location and conditions of the consent, including whether it was 
night, whether the police retained the individual's identification, whether the individual 
was free to leave, and wt1ether the individual knew of [his/her] right to refuse consent." 
State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 643, 645 (Ct. App. 2007). Additionally, it has been held that 
a police officer's promise for leniency, including promises not to arrest a defendant in 
return for a defendant's consent to a search constitutes a factor which can be 
considered when evaluating whether consent was voluntarily provided. See State v. 
Kysar, 114 Idaho 457 Cl 988); see also State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 77 4, 780 (Ct. App. 
2006). 
In this case, there are various factors present which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Floyd's consent was coerced. Officer Richardson stopped Mr. Floyd at night on a 
street which was not well lit. (07/31/14 Tr., p.7, L.7 - p.8, L.8, p.9, Ls.24-25.) Officer 
Richardson approached Mr. Floyd in an unmarked police car and suddenly activated his 
lights. (07/31/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-12.) This would convey a show of authority and would 
also convey that this stop was unique in that he was not approached by a marked police 
car. The intimidating nature if this stop was exacerbated when Officer Finley arrived at 
the scene between thirty to forty seconds after Officer Richardson stopped Mr. Floyd. 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.24, Ls.2-8.) It should be noted that Officer Finley was acting as cover 
officer and kept his distance from and did not speak with Mr. Floyd, which further adds 
to the intimidating nature of this contact. (07/31/14 Tr., p.24, L.19 - p.25, L.22.) 
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Additionally, both of the officers were wearing police uniforms and had visible firearms. 
(07/31/14 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-24, p.24, Ls.2-18.) 
After Officer Richardson determined that Mr. Floyd and Mr. Alvarez were not the 
men he was looking for, he started asking incriminating questions. (07/31/'14 Tr., p.8, 
L.9 - p.9, L.18.) Officer Richardson only asked incriminating questions and did not 
engage in any small talk, which conveyed that this was not a consensual encounter. 
(See generally 07/31/14 Tr.) Officer Richardson never told Mr. Floyd he was free to 
leave or otherwise terminate the encounter with Officer Richardson. (07/31/14 Tr., p.19, 
Ls. ·19-22.) It was in this coercive and intimidating atmosphere that Officer Richardson 
suggested that he would not arrest Mr. Floyd for being an intoxicated pedestrian if 
Mr. Floyd agreed to take Officer Richardson and Officer Finley back to his home to get 
Mr. Floyd's drug paraphernalia. (07/3·1/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.14-22, p:18, L.7 -p.20, L.5.) 
Under those circumstances, a reasonable person in Mr. Floyd's position would not feel 
free to refuse Officer Richardson's request. Moreover, the promise not to arrest 
Mr. Floyd if he cooperated would have created a false sense of security which 
undermined Mr. Floyd's ability to refuse to cooperate with Officer Richardson. 
Further support for Mr. Floyd's position can be found in State v. Rector, 144 
Idaho 643 (Ct. App. 2007). In that case, two police officers were patrolling when they 
observed Rector walking away from the direction of an apartment where drug activity 
was suspected. Id. at. 643-644. The police officers stopped their unmarked police car 
and approached Rector on foot. Id. at 644. The officers were in plain clothes, but had 
visible firearms. Id. One of the officers asked Rector how she was doing and Rector 
asked if the officer had a search warrant. Id. The officer did not tell Rector that she was 
free to leave or that she could refuse to answer his questions. Id. 
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The conversation between the police and Rector continued and one officer 
frisked Rector because she kept touching one of her pant pockets after being told not to 
do so. Id. Rector then asked if she could smoke a cigarette and a police officer said 
yes. Id. After removing a cigarette from her pocket, the officer asked her what she had 
in her pocket and Rector said she had some candies and some "miscellaneous stuff." 
Id. The officer then asked to see the contents of her pockets and Rector pulled out 
some candy and a bag with a white powdery substance, which was subsequently 
determined to be methamphetamine. Id. 
Rector filed a suppression motion arguing that she was coerced into emptying 
her pocket. Id. The district court agreed with Rector and suppressed the 
methamphetamine. Id. The State appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
district court, holding: 
[T]he district court found that Rector's act of pulling the methamphetamine 
from her pocket was not an act of free will but the product of coercive 
circumstances. The court identified several factors contributing to a 
coercive atmosphere, including the facts that Rector had been confronted 
by two armed officers at night and had been questioned, frisked, and then 
subjected to further questioning. The court also noted that by asking the 
deputies for permission to smoke, Rector had demonstrated that she did 
not consider the encounter to be consensual but rather considered herself 
to be under the control of the deputies. 
The deputy's testimony at the suppression hearing provides substantial 
evidence supporting each of the district court's predicate factual findings. It 
additionally shows that Rector had evidenced an unwillingness to talk to 
the deputies by asking at the outset whether they had a search warrant, 
that Rector had not been informed of her right to refuse consent, and that 
she had not been told that she was free to leave. These further facts add 
support to the district court's finding that Rector's disclosure of the 
contents of her pocket was not consensual. 
Id. at 646. 
When the relevant factors present in this matter are compared to those in Rector, 
this case was far more intimidating than Rector. In this case and in Rector, Mr. Floyd 
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was approached by two police officers at night. However, Officer Richardson activated 
his overhead lights and Officer Finley arrived at the scene between thirty and forty 
seconds after Mr. Floyd was stopped. Both of these events created an atmosphere 
which was more coercive than the one in Rector, because the use of the headlights was 
more intimidating than being approached by two officers on foot. Additionally, this stop 
was more intimidating than Rector, because in Rector both of the officers approached 
Rector at the same time. In this case, Officer Finley's later arrival would have escalated 
the initial show of authority exacerbating the intimidating nature of the encounter. 
Moreover, in Rector the police officer asked Rector to disclose the contents of her 
pockAts. In this case, Mr. Floyd was also promised that he would not be arrested if he 
complied with Officer Richardson's arrest. 
Since Mr. Floyd's consent was the product of coercion the remedy is suppression 
of the State's evidence. Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, the remedy is 
suppression of the State's evidence. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 (1992). 
If it is determined that Mr. Floyd's initial consent for police to enter his home was 
the product of coercion, then Mr. Floyd's subsequent consent to search his bedroom 
was also tainted by the prior coercion and all of the evidence discovered in Mr. Floyd's 
home must be suppressed. "If evidence is not seized pursuant to a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal 
search must be excluded as the 'fruit of the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dome, 139 
Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 
(1963)). Moreover, "When police conduct has violated an accused's constitutional rights 
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before he consents to a search, the State must prove that the consent was not procured 
by exploitation of the previous illegality." State v. Tietsott, 145 Idaho ·112, 117 (Ct. App. 
2007). This includes all of the evidence used to establish a basis for Mr. Floyd's 
possession conviction. 
In sum, Mr. Floyd's consent in this matter was not voluntarily given because the 
circumstances surrounding Mr. Floyd's interaction with Officer Richardson would have 
communicated to a reasonable person he was required to comply with Officer 
Richardson's request to enter Mr. Floyd's home. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Floyd respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying his motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this y!h day of May, 2015. 
/~/---7 (r-
/ ---------/_· ------
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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